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What is narrative? 
 
Corinne Squire 
 
In this paper, I want to look at two aspects of narrative that relate to common definitions of it, 
in order to take apart those definitions and reconfigure them in another way.   
I shall start with a very broad definition of a narrative as a chain of signs with particular 
rather than general social, cultural and/or historical meanings. This definition means that 
narratives  can involve sign sets that move temporally, causally, or in some other socio-
culturally recognizable way, and that because they operate with particularity rather than 
generality, they are not reducible to theories. Within this definition, narrative can operate 
across media, including within still images. It derives simply from the succession of signs, 
independent of the symbol system, medium, or ‘semiotic matrix’ (Brockmeier, forthcoming) 
in which that succession occurs. However, in a narrative, the movement from sign to sign has 
a recognizable social, cultural and historical significance. A number series is a progression of 
signs, but its primary meaning is mathematical and does not lie in social, cultural or historical 
realms. A corollary of this definition is that stories do not have universal currency; they draw 
on and work within particular social, cultural and historical symbolic resources. The ‘reading’ 
of stories may therefore shift or break down between distinct social, cultural and historical 
worlds. Within such a definition, visual materials can certainly constitute narratives.  
In many accounts of narrative, stories’ temporal progression is privileged; I am not, however, 
prioritising it in the above definition. Lives unfold in time, so does the hearing or reading of 
stories, and stories’ ability to parallel the lifecourse on this dimension is often taken as 
determining their value. But just because they happen in time, this doesn’t mean that time is 
their major organising principle. After all, they happen in space too, and narrative researchers 
much more rarely spend time exploring the parallels between the spatial dimensions of bodies 
and lives, and the spatial extension of voices, writing, image. Moreover, the nonlinearity of 
apparently temporally arranged narratives is also acknowledged as highly significant within 
literary and cultural theory, as with the post-nineteenth century novel, or ways in which 
comic artists often disrupt the left-to-right, top-to-bottom temporal coding of images, or more 
complexly, the gaps within Jo Spence’s (1999) sequences of photographs of her cancer 
experiences. Psychoanalytic accounts of film, too suggest it is a medium pre-eminently suited 
to examine the flexible timings of the unconscious. Temporality thus signally fails to explain 
the narrative power even of moving images - unless we recast all that falls outside it as other 
forms of temporality, a move that merely reinstates it as an organising principle.  
Still images are perhaps the most interesting cases to examine for narrative outside 
temporality – if, that is, we except those versions of them that are clearly temporally marked 
as for instance a moment in a larger verbal story, or a life; or those images that are 
surrounded by explicating text that ‘tells their story.’  As Rosalind Krauss (1993) has pointed 
out, there can be movement within still images. Writing about Cindy Sherman’s ‘disaster’ 
photographs, which re-enact, with mimetic failure and excess, earlier ‘history’ paintings, 
Krauss describes an ‘erosion of form from within’ in these still images as they move towards 
‘formlessness,’ set in downward motion by the gravitational ‘forces of the horizontal.’ This 
generates another kind of narrative succession, towards, as Barthes (2009) would say more 
generally, death, within the photographs.  
 
Sherman’s later photographs of ambiguous materials, abject and decomposing, trace similar 
progressions more explicitly, and without the historicising connotations of the ‘disaster’ 
series which could be taken as implicit temporalisation. In these later photographs, 
progressions of decay occur across the image, but they are not temporally marked and need 
not be read as such: 
                            
   
 
Similarly, the recent BBC radio series, made with the British Museum, a ‘History of the 
world in 100 objects’ (MacGregor, 2011) allowed those objects to display narratives 
crystallised within them. Of course, there are stories written about the objects, and they can 
be fitted into broader historical narratives too. However, the visible marks that the objects 
bear upon them show their narratives to some degree, independently of the other stories 
around them. This West African drum, for instance, demonstrates its origin in the wood it is 
made of. Its skin, reflecting the next stage in its journey and a complex, indeterminate history 
within slavery, is North American. The object’s location in the British Museum indexes the 
US-based collecting of rich English merchants, who were also often implicated in slavery. 
Some of this history is written strikingly into the object; much is not, but these historical 
disjunctions also at times figure within the object, for instance in the disconnect between 
wood and skin. 
 
Figure 3 Akan drum 
 Laura Mulvey (2006) has suggested that contemporary visual technologies point up some 
different, ‘delayed’ ways to look at moving images.  Pausing moving images, repeating them, 
zooming in, taking images apart and recombining them – these processes emphasise how 
meanings can be deferred and reconfigured.  They suggest a more reflective, ‘pensive’ way of 
relating narratively to images. Contemporary processes of image reading thus show how we 
can read narratives in altered, fragmented and open ways. Mulvey addresses primarily 
moving images, but still images and objects provide a similar deferred narrative possibility, 
repeatedly stirred up by the differences within the image or object that a ‘pensive’ reading 
foregrounds – by subtle details within it, for instance.  
This account of narrative moves away from what is perhaps the socio-historically specific 
dominance of ‘pure’ temporality in narrative studies, sustained in social-scientific ideas about 
narrative longer than in some other fields (Mitchell, 1987; Fried, 2012). The lack of 
foregrounded temporality in still visual images and objects especially, allows us to look at 
other possibilities – spatiality, conceptual progressions, interpersonal co-constructions – as 
primary narrative organisers. 
Anthony Appiah talks about the open possibilities of future readings of the Akan drum. It is 
often said that objects and images are more likely than verbal materials to generate shifting or 
broken narrative readings through their ‘openness’ – that is, through the much larger set of 
signifiers to which each signified potentially connects. This truism perhaps derives its force 
from the comforting but misleading familiarity of certain kinds of language, rather than visual 
or object, interpretation, within contemporary western cultures – and also from long histories 
within those cultures of argument about the relative functions and status of words and images 
(Derrida, 1987; Mitchell, 1987). When we start to read in detail, at different levels, for what 
is not there as well as what is, it is no longer self-evident that verbal stories allow more stable 
and bounded readings than visual or object narratives. Multiplicity, fracture and contradiction 
characterize narratives across media. Narratives are all put together from signs whose own 
disarticulations are compounded by the chains of signs that constitute stories. 
 I am going to look now at the place of exceptions in narratives, especially in relation to the 
HIV epidemic, my main research field, whose exceptionality is itself often the subject of 
debate. In relation to this epidemic, I think we can see exceptional stories working in at least 
two different and valuable ways.  
The importance of particularity in stories, which in its most acute form manifests as 
exceptions,  is widely recognised by narrative researchers – the particularity of stories is 
indeed what distinguishes narrative from theory, for instance, for Bruner (1990). I think this 
distinction is useful - narrative is usually differentiated from theory, precisely to the extent 
that it explicates through specificity. But the distinction is not fully tenable. My own work 
and that of many others is always concerned with multiple instances of narratives studied 
across multiple participants – not as many as would be addressed in a quantitative study of 
course, but a number similar to that characterising many qualitative studies. In such work, 
researchers are aiming not for generalisability, which relies on defined conventions of 
sampling and significance –although these of course differ markedly between social, natural 
and physical sciences. Rather, this kind of work relies on what is often called transferability 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985) – that is, the possibility for audiences and very often, researchers 
themselves to relate findings from one context to those in another context, to make 
connections that may offer ways of understanding other findings in other contexts and that 
may even suggest what findings may emerge in them. This is not generalisability or 
predictivity but rather, pragmatic versions of them which recast them as transferability and 
informed speculation. 
In such circumstances, narratives, analysed across multiple instances, can produce heuristics, 
if not theories, of phenomena.  Theories in any case occur at multiple levels, and many of 
them are pretty close to being heuristics, especially in the social sciences.  The possibility that 
such heuristics offer of going beyond description and singularity in researching narratives is 
important. But the role of specificity and exceptions doesn’t seem strong in such an account. 
However, it is narratives’ rootedness in the particular that allows them to bring into research, 
phenomena that are new, ignored, or recalcitrant because of their complexity and opaqueness. 
It’s this rooted particularity that allows narrative research to become more or differently 
transferable, to build better heuristics. 
There is also a large amount of narrative research that is much more clearly grounded in 
particularity: research on specific stories, biographies, and cases. Elliot Mishler’s (1999) 
work has been exemplary in arguing for the importance of variability in narrative research, 
showing that such research is not just doing what the majority of qualitative research does 
anyway, but is contributing something really distinctive in its exhaustive pursuit of what 
comes next in the story, the other story, the untold or unheard story. I think this is 
interestingly different from what anthropological particularity offers, though this is a 
distinction needing more unpacking than can be achieved here.  
Such variability and particularity function in two apparently different ways. Sometimes they 
are emblematic. Part of this emblematising process, involves including exceptionality. The 
exceptional nature of  some stories helps support arguments, because it suggests the 
generality across highly idiosyncratic circumstances of those arguments. So in such cases, 
stories are found or constructed and used to illustrate or encapsulate a more general truth, as 
when researchers tend to use story extracts in describing narrative patterns across a large 
dataset. It’s clear, though, that in such cases, the individual story does not really matter for 
the argument, even if it is what readers remember; and also, that a story can be used to bolster 
some quite questionable arguments, because the reliance on stories tends to divert readers, 
both logically and because of the sheer column inches the stories take up. Narrative 
researchers are not immune to these failings.  
The other way in which narrative particularity functions is explicitly as exception – that is, to 
point up radically distinct phenomena rather than to illustrate general ones. This kind of 
particularity involves unassimilable stories which point outside the usual theoretical frame. 
Such stories can be problematic for narrative researchers. Sometimes indeed researchers 
might be advised to throw such stories out of their dataset, such is their atypicality. Their 
theoretical reach is apparently  limited – they can support only a preliminary, single-instance 
account  - but their significance for the testing and development of theory  -or heuristics - is 
great.  By making things messy, they challenge existing explanations and expand the scope of 
future ones. 
Looking more broadly at narrative material, I think it’s helpful to think about such narrative 
exceptions as never fully exceptional, and about radical exceptionality as appearing even in 
apparently more emblematic, transferable material. Narrative exceptions get their strength 
from the conventions they step outside; narrative conventions get their strength from their 
exceptions. (This, perhaps, is how the notion of exceptionality differs most clearly from that 
of deviant case analysis - Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Nussbaum (1998) has argued something 
similar in the case of tragedy. Circumstances of suffering may be baroque and distant, 
unalloyedly exceptional, she says, but that only underlines the commonality of suffering 
itself, and of the agentic albeit doomed attempts within tragedy to overcome it. At Occupy 
London’s Tent City University, at a stories workshop, I told a story about an HIV positive 
woman in South Africa specifically for us to see whether the radical otherness of the material 
made any narrative sense in that context. It was indeed the strong unfamiliarity of the details 
of the story that reinforced the common narrative line the listeners extracted: that terrible 
events can be accepted, transcended and even used to shape a progressive life path.  Again 
this dialectical working of narrative convention with exception is hardly a new or original 
insight. Mishler (1999), presenting material from craftartists’ individually unique life stories, 
points out that across this disparateness the common occurrence of turning points in life 
narratives for instance is apparent to readers in very different circumstances. 
Conversely, moments of exceptionality can often be recognised in even the most 
conventional narratives. They are the signifiers that drop out of the story without having a 
clear meaning, the unreadable elements that either stick in the head or immediately get 
forgotten, like the puncta that Barthes (2009) describes in photographs. This is where reading 
for exceptionality, what Schor (2006) calls reading in detail, becomes important for all 
narrative work, whether it’s based on small or large stories, cases or large databases. 
Recalcitrance to meaning is indeed the appeal I would say of the particularity of stories – the 
unincorporable elements of them. Many critics of the narrative turn – Craib (2004), Frosh 
(2002), Cowen (2009) - suggest that we are seduced by the closure and predictability of 
stories, while lives are messy, inchoate and nonsensical. But a growing body of research and 
indeed all our work at CNR I’d say emphasises the incoherence, the intrinsic multiplicity and 
contradictions of stories (Hyvarinen et al, 2010) . In this we are drawing on wellestablished 
literary-theoretical ideas about the discontinuities within language, including narrative 
language (Butler, 2005). In my case, particularly in relation to HIV narratives I’ve found the 
work of the analyst and literary theorist Julia Kristeva (1984) useful in trying to read stories 
as provisional nets of meaning thrown over abysses of unrepresentable abjection. 
(Of course there are pleasures of repetition and closure in narratives, but it’s interesting that 
exact repetition, exact closure, is not what we usually demand of stories. Even for children, 
the much-desired repetition of a story is happening always in another context that (as Derrida 
in Cornell, 2005, puts it) opens up another meaning. Even in oral traditions often caricatured 
as faithful reproducers of narratives, innovation is prized alongside familiarity. As we might 
expect then, the recuperative power of stories, well captured in McAdams’s (2006)’s book on 
redemption narratives, is always underpinned and shadowed by stories’ more disruptive 
effects. Cowen says we avoid the ‘complex story maps’ that are really required to do justice 
to phenomena; I think that such complexity is itself attractive, even if it is implicit and covert 
within many apparently conventional and coherent stories. Perhaps the other interesting thing 
about what Cowen calls his suspicion of narrative is that it’s a suspicion of pleasure, surfaces, 
triviality, ‘meaningless’ details, perhaps femininity itself. 
I want to turn now to exceptionality in some stories from my most recent research about HIV. 
Of course, exceptionality in the HIV case applies to lived phenomena and not only stories. 
But there has been longstanding argument in the HIV industry about just how exceptional 
HIV is – is it just another condition of low health resources, gender inequity, 
underdevelopment and postolonialism? Is there something exceptional about its scale, 
stigmatisation and effects? Or is this ‘exceptionalist’ claim simply one made to extort money 
from northern governments and international NGOs while the epidemic flattens out into yet 
another ongoing health problem? Is HIV now just differentially treatable according to 
resources, like many other conditions, with strong but not unique resource implications and 
no likely new theoretical interest for social researchers? (De Waal, 2006).  
In my most recent interview round investigating HIV support in the UK, I interviewed 46 
people living with HIV – 15 of whom I’ve interviewed before – and found a strong tension 
between the narrative naturalization of HIV- its management through medicalisation 
normalisation and marketisation – and the narrative disruption of such processes by stories of 
being left behind by treatment, social services, public representations of the epidemic,  by 
stories of everyday lives lived excluded from or on the margins of families, work, 
relationships, citizenship, and by stories of resisting medicalisation, refusing to be normal, 
rejecting markets or setting up their own (Squire, 2010). These disruptions do indeed 
demonstrate HIV exceptionalism, though I think there are better ways to describe it . For it’s 
really about not a general HIV exceptionalism of the kind that used to be argued for, but 
rather, about very specific characteristics: the particular history of illness and deaths around 
this condition; its particular medical unpredictability and treatment difficulty; its particular 
and continuing, sexualised, gendered, homophobic stigmatisation in many contexts;  and the 
particular new physiological and psychosocial phenomena around this relatively young 
condition that are always coming into existence and the specific unspoken abdication of HIV 
treatment in low-income countries (Nguyen, 2010) and its limitations in many other contexts. 
While one can see such narrative patterns across different epidemic contexts, developing over 
the last decade and a half of treatment access in the west, the narrative tension has I think 
increased in the contemporary austerity context, so that many of the stories in the interviews 
appeared to be stories about living in a recession rather than living with HIV, accompanied 
by concomitant moments of narrative alternatives where interviewees found ways of framing 
their neoliberal lives differently. 
I want to present a couple of stories whose narrative exceptionality is also a way of 
conveying these particularities of the HIV epidemic. First, this is a story Robert (all names 
are pseudonyms) told – not for the first time- by about how he met his boyfriend.  
Robert: Yes, I mean, it’s quite funny, because he's someone that I'd seen around for years, 
who I fancied, and then we got into contact online and then, there's an application on the 
iPhone, called Grindr, and I messaged him on Grindr, and we were chatting on that and then I 
thought, ‘right, I'll disclose’, so I disclosed that I was positive, and he said, oh, ‘so am I’, and 
I went, ‘ oh cool’ and he said, ‘those aren't the words I'd use, but I know what you mean.’ 
This is a story, which Robert himself tells as atypical, of romance and disclosure by 
messaging – Robert later says he thinks that medium gives people a space to respond that 
face-to-face disclosure does not - , and of a transgressive valuing of HIV as ‘cool’. Robert’s 
now-boyfriend thought the last text message a little un-pc; Robert like a number of other 
interviewers talked a few times about his flippant and ‘darkly’ humorous address to HIV, 
something not all HIV positive people, let alone all people, shared. A lot of audiences, of all 
HIV positive statuses, can understand a story that ends with the relief of two people not 
having to deal with serodiscordance in their relationship – calling that ‘cool’ for many 
contravenes an appropriate seriousness. However, this story of ‘cool’ does work to exemplify 
something really specific about the epidemic in this time, in those circumstances: that HIV 
positive people who are being treated can and will consider and sometimes have unprotected 
sex with each other, as Robert describes later – and perhaps with people who are HIV 
negative -because their low viral loads make infection risks very small. This, within a 
continuing context of blaming HIV positive people for their condition and othering them, can 
be a disturbing thought – should people living with HIV have the same pleasures as everyone 
else? And if people living with HIV can be so healthy that unprotected sex is not risky, how 
can they understood as reassuringly, punitively different from others?   
The ‘coolness’ Robert mentions is also related by him later to him and his boyfriend’s ability 
to care for one another, and here again the exceptionality of this story points to something 
quite particular about the contemporary UK epidemic: that it’s invisibilised, medicalised and 
stigmatised to such an extent that much non-medical care is indeed given by HIV positive 
people to other HIV positive people. Perhaps something else that’s transgressive about this 
story, is that readers glimpse in it something of the seriously uncool social relations HIV 
positive people often have with those of other statuses, the personal toll exacted  by exclusion 
and othering.  
I want now to show you a really different story, again highly specific and in this way opening 
up the contemporary contexts of the epidemic as well as escaping them in its idiosyncracy –
but working more as radical exception, less as exemplification. Here is Dorothy, an HIV 
positive woman in her forties from Southern Africa, living in the UK, telling us about her 
difficulties with her daughter, and how her son died:  
Dorothy: She (daughter) still in {country 1} yes um, I tried to bring her but it didn’t work out 
and then I thought, I thought she was in primary school there going to secondary school so I 
had not looked for a place for her because I thought it was going to be possible but it didn’t, I 
had to go back to my sister again and beg her to take her so she took her, and then at one time 
she beat her up, with um you know the rawhide, you know they put a stick at the other end , 
she beat her, my daughter never told me, she beat her and she put salt and put chillies, my 
daughter never told me, I didn’t know about it until she went to visit at her father’s sister, 
that’s when they saw the scars and asked her and then she told them that my sister had beaten 
her and she had stolen some money from her , she didn’t want me to send her money but I 
said when I was going to school my parents used to give me a 50 cents at least you know...I 
feel I haven’t been there for my children you know and my son died in his sleep and I 
understand he was fasting,  I don’t know what for and er, I dunno they told me at one time he 
wanted to commit suicide, and I regret having I told him to look after his sister you know, 
and I regret having told him that, because I don’t know why he wanted to commit suicide you 
know, seeing the people in Africa who are HIV.   
This is one narrative sequence in a complex interview story that piles difficulty on loss on 
guilt on struggle. It is not more difficult in content than other stories in the interview. 
However, it is more problematic to ‘make sense’ of. 
There are groups of stories about migration, detention, leaving children, living on vouchers, 
and getting diagnosed late, to all of which Dorothy’s interview contributes. These stories of 
hers act as a kind of window onto the range of issues HIV positive migrants face, issues so 
wideranging and intense that HIV itself often disappears from the picture. Such particularities 
tell us that HIV is often not at the centre of people’s stories; they lay out the current 
complexity of those other factors as well as of HIV itself.  In addition, many of these stories 
perform a depression that cannot be generalised or narrated away, that just gets repeated 
again and again, that is inevitably quite disturbing to listen to and much more to tell -but that 
is highly comprehensible. However, some of Dorothy’s stories – like those above - are also 
exceptional in ways that do not convey understanding. These stories of her sister and children 
contain many elements that are entirely idiosyncratic. She has an ambivalent and very 
specific relationship with her sister, particularly but not only around HIV; she has a daughter 
who has tried to protect her from sending remittances by stealing money; her son, who had a 
serious non-HIV-related illness, contemplated suicide because, she fears, her injunction to 
take care of his sister led him to know his mother had HIV, and to fear that– like other HIV 
positive people he had known – she would die; perhaps his fasting was expiatory.  
Such exceptional stories are not illustrative. They open up aspects of the epidemic such as 
relationships within HIV affected families, and across generations, that call for explanation, 
without telling us much about them. Nevertheless, such variability is important to know about 
even if, in the present, recognising it is all we can do; otherwise we would indeed be settling 
for the stories we know, the familiar ones, the comfortable ones that do not jibe with 
messiness of lives.  
It is at this point of radical exceptionality , that the question of what narrative is, comes close 
to another question: what is narrative for? As Butler (2005) suggests, this is, in the case of 
personal narratives, foundationally a moral question. Self-narratives position us ethically in 
response to the social call to be moral subjects. But the moral narrative order is a contested 
and sometimes incomprehensible terrain. Narrative’s radical exceptions lead us to think about 
the particularity of stories as ethical, not just representational, features. 
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